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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to section 10-3-1106(6)(a) of the Utah Code. Under this grant of 
jurisdiction, the court may review only "[a] final action or order of the appeal 
board." UTAH CODE § 10-3-1106(6)(a). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the Employee Appeal Board1 abuse its discretion in upholding 
the demotion of Officer Aaron Rosen as a proportional and proper 
sanction for his actions? 
The court reviews the final order of an employee appeal board "for the 
purpose of determining if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its 
authority." UTAH CODE § 10-3-1106(6)(c); see also Turner v. Lone Peak Public 
Safety Dist, 2010 UT App 168, U 1 n.2, 235 P.3d 797 (declining to review an 
employee appeal board's order for correctness because "the statute that grants 
[the court] authority and jurisdiction to hear [these] matter[s] limits [the court's] 
review to determining if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its 
authority"). To constitute an abuse of discretion, the disciplinary order must 
"exceedfl the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Guenon v. Midvale City, 
2010 UT App 51,1] 4, 230 P.3d 1032, cert, denied, 238 P.3d 443 (Utah 2010); 
1
 Throughout this brief, the City of Saratoga Springs Employee Appeal Board 
generally shall be referred to as the "Board." 
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see also Sorge v. Office of the Attorney Gen., 2006 UT App 2, fl 22, 128 P.3d 
566, cert, denied, 138 P.3d 589 (Utah 2006) ("An agency abuses its discretion 
when it reaches an outcome that is clearly against the logic and the effect of such 
facts . . . or against the reasonable and probable deductions to be drawn from 
the facts disclosed upon the hearing." (internal quotation omitted)). This issue 
was raised below. [R. 52] 
II. Did the Employee Appeal Board abuse its discretion when it declined 
to draw an adverse inference regarding the missing audio recording? 
An employee appeal board's final order is reviewed under an abuse of 
discretion standard. UTAH CODE § 10-3-1106(6)(c). To constitute an abuse of 
discretion, the appeal board's order must "exceedQ the bounds of 
reasonableness and rationality." Guenon, 2010 UT App 51, fl 4. This issue was 
raised below. [R. 59:38-50] 
III. In receiving certain exhibits before the post-discipline hearing, did 
the Employee Appeal Board exceed its authority when it issued its 
final order? 
The court may review an employee appeal board's final order to determine 
whether the order exceeded the board's authority. UTAH C O D E § 10-3-1106(6)(c). 
In determining whether an employee appeal board has exceeded its authority in 
issuing a final order, the court reviews the board's action for correctness. See 
Howick v. Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Bd., 2009 UT App 334, fl 13, 222 
P.3d 763; see also Tasters Ltd. v. Dep'tofEmp't Sec, 863 P.2d 12,19 (Utah Ct. 
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App. 1993) (noting that when reviewing whether an agency has exceeded its 
authority, the court reviews the agency action "for legal error, without 
deference"). Regarding the authority granted to the employee appeal board, the 
court may examine the authority given by statute, municipal ordinance, and 
municipal policy. See Howick, 2009 UT App 334, % 13. 
This issue was not preserved below. Although the Board admitted that it 
received certain exhibits before the post-discipline hearing, Rosen objected only 
to the content of the exhibits. He made no argument that the Board exceeded its 
authority in receiving or reviewing the evidence. [R. 59:16-67] 
IV. Were the Employee Appeal Board's findings clearly erroneous? 
An employee appeal board's factual findings will not be overturned unless 
they are clearly erroneous, and the findings will be upheld if they are supported 
by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the record as a whole. See Kelly 
v. Salt Lake City Civil Sen/. Comm'n, 2000 UT App 235, % 15, 8 P.3d 1048; 
Lucas v. Murray City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746, 758 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997). Substantial evidence constitutes "that quantum and quality of relevant 
evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a 
conclusion." Lucas, 949 P.2d at 758. This issue was raised below. [R. 52] 
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APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CODE §10-3-1106 
Saratoga Springs Police Department Rules and Regulations, §§ 2.0, 2.24, 
3.0, 3.15, 3.29, 4.0, 4.56 (copies of the referenced sections of the 
Saratoga Springs Police Department Rules and Regulations are attached 
in the addendum) 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At the time of the disciplinary action at issue, Petitioner and Appellant 
Aaron Rosen ("Rosen") had been a police officer for 12 years. [R. 59:301] The 
City of Saratoga Springs (the "City") hired Rosen as a patrol corporal supervisor. 
[R. 59:302] At the time of his demotion, Rosen had worked for the City for just 
under 4 years. [R. 59:302] 
Rosen's duties included supervising the day-to-day affairs as a patrol 
supervisor, overseeing the officers at the City. At nighttime, he also oversaw the 
officers in Bluffdale. As a corporal, he also had responsibility for training and, 
occasionally, discipline. [R. 59:302-303] 
I. The First Phase of the Internal Affairs Investigation 
A. The Pants Dropping Incident 
On January 18, 2011, a citizen approached Records Clerk Cristy2 Soper 
("Soper") with a recording of an auto accident. [R. 59:54-55] Soper was 
2
 Throughout the Board hearing transcript, Cristy Soper's first name is spelled 
"Christy." 
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standing at the front counter of the records room, which is located in the 
building's front lobby area. [R. 59:54, 57] Soper thought it best for a police officer 
to take the evidence so she looked at the schedule and determined that Rosen 
was the supervisor over the officer assigned to the case. [R. 59:54-56] 
Soper then went to speak with Rosen. At that time, Rosen and Sgt. Edwin 
Christensen ("Sgt. Christensen") were in the sergeants' office, which is located 
directly behind the records room. [R. 59:55, 58] Soper walked approximately 6 to 
7 feet down a hallway and stood in the doorway to the sergeants' office, facing 
inward. [R. 59:56-60, 128-129] Sgt. Christensen met Soper at the door. Rosen 
was standing behind and just to the left of Sgt. Christensen. [R. 59:128-129] 
Because Rosen indicated he was not on duty, Soper directed her request 
for assistance to Sgt. Christensen. [R. 59:59-60] Soper stated that while she was 
speaking with Sgt. Christensen, she looked over and saw that Rosen's pants 
were down around his knees. Soper could see his white undergarments and the 
entire front of his crotch area, including a "darkness" behind his undergarments. 
Soper was so surprised, she exclaimed "wow." Soper quickly turned her head 
away. Rosen commented "well, look at that, you didn't even skip a beat. It was 
like your husband standing there." [R. 59:59-61, 61; Ex. 1 at R. 2] 
When asked about this incident, Sgt. Christensen stated that he heard 
Soper let out an exclamation so he turned and saw Rosen's pants down to just 
above his knees. [R. 59:128] Sgt. Christensen indicated he could see Rosen's 
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white underwear but Rosen's shirttail covered his crotch, or "private," area. [Ex. 4 
at R. 5; R. 59:129] Sgt. Christensen recalled some verbal give-and-take between 
Soper and Rosen and that Soper's husband was mentioned, but he could not 
recall the specifics. [R. 59:135-136] Sgt. Christensen described Soper's reaction 
as shocked. [R. 59:136] 
Claiming an accidental wardrobe malfunction, and blaming an oversized 
uniform, Rosen stated he unbuckled his belt and unzipped his pants to tuck in his 
shirt. He said he was hanging on to the left side of his pants and, because of the 
weight of his phone, his pants fell at an angle from left to right to just above his 
knees. [R. 59:416; Ex. 6 at R. 8, 9] Rosen denied that his crotch area was 
exposed because it was covered by his shirttail. [R. 59:313-314] Further, Rosen 
stated that he unzipped his pants to tuck in his shirt only after Soper had stepped 
away and then turned back. [Ex. 6 at R. 8] Sgt. Christensen denied that Soper 
turned away or left the area at any point prior to Rosen dropping his pants. 
[R. 59:132] Rosen also claimed that he immediately apologized [Ex. 6 at R. 9], 
but Sgt. Christensen denied hearing any apology. [R. 59:136] 
After Soper returned to her desk, she felt scared, angry, and humiliated for 
being put in that situation. [R. 59:62-64] After a few minutes, she reported the 
incident to her supervisor, Kim Wright. [R. 59:63] Ms. Wright asked Sgt. 
Christensen about the incident, and he confirmed what occurred. [R. 59:131-132; 
140-142] 
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Ms. Wright described Soper's demeanor as "very upset, distraught, almost 
actual shock" and that her face was red and her eyes were watery. 
[R. 59:141-142] She instructed Soper to type up a written statement and then 
sent her home. [R. 59:63, 141; Ex. 1 at R. 2] 
Ms. Wright presented Soper's written statement to Police Chief Gary 
Hicken. [R. 59:141] Chief Hicken assigned Sgt. Kenneth Cole to conduct an 
internal affairs ("IA") investigation into the incident. [R. 59:165-166] 
On January 19, 2011, Sgt. Cole spoke with Rosen and told him that he had 
been assigned to do an IA investigation into the pants dropping incident. 
[R. 59:166-167] In that first interview, Rosen denied that his pants fell down. He 
claimed that he had been losing weight and when he unzipped his pants, the 
weight from the phone started to pull his pants down but that he grabbed them 
with his hand to hold them up. [R. 59:169-170] Rosen also denied making any 
comment about Soper's husband. [R. 59:170-171] However, in a written 
statement dated January 22, 2011, which Rosen voluntarily submitted to Sgt. 
Cole, Rosen stated that he remembered stating something like "...ha! Well I 
know that wasn't fun...but I'm sure you guys see this a lot; oh, and even you (to 
Cristy) with your husband [Mark] too!"3 [Ex. 6 at R. 9] 
3
 Soper's husband is a police officer with the Sandy Police Department. 
[R. 59:61] 
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As part of the January 19th interview, Sgt. Cole testified that he told 
Rosen, 
I told him that Christy was very upset. And I told him, I said, it would be 
best if you don't have any contact with her, don't have any professional - I 
mean only have professional contact with her, nothing away from that. 
[R. 59:173] Sgt. Cole further testified, 
I told him that Christy had - was upset... And that she shouldn't be 
contacted. A formal complaint had come in, and until we were done with 
this, there was to be no contact with her except for professional contact. 
[R. 59:177] 
In an addendum to his IA investigation report, Sgt. Cole described his 
directive as "At the conclusion of the interview, I directed Rosen to only have 
'professional contact' with C. Soper until things 'cooled off.'" [Ex. 14 at R. 29] 
After interviewing Rosen, Soper, and Sgt. Christensen, Sgt. Cole 
recommended that Rosen be given a verbal reprimand for the pants dropping 
incident. In his report dated January 28, 2011, Sgt. Cole indicated he 
recommended a verbal reprimand because (a) while discrepancies were found in 
Rosen's statements, "the investigation could not articulate whether the 
inconsistencies were due to memory exertion or fabrication" and (b) the 
"investigation was not able to distinguish whether this action was intentional, an 
accident, or a result of poor judgment." [Ex. 12 at R. 28] Sgt. Cole testified that, 
despite the inconsistencies, he gave Rosen the benefit of the doubt in deciding to 
recommend a verbal warning. [R. 59:189-190] Chief Hicken adopted Sgt. Cole's 
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recommendation and delivered the verbal reprimand to Rosen on January 28 
for violation of Policy & Procedure 2.0. [Ex. 12 at R. 28; R. 59:249-250] 
II. Rosen's Violation of Sgt Cole's January 19, 2011, ProfessionaB 
Contact Only Order 
At the hearing, Rosen denied that Sgt. Cole gave him a professional 
contact only order on January 19th. However, in a recorded interview between 
Sgt. Cole and Rosen on February 11, 2011, during the second phase of the IA 
investigation, Rosen admitted receiving the directive to have only professional 
contact with Soper. 
Sgt. Cole: We'll be discussing an IA that had been done previous. Aaron, 
in the internal affairs investigation, I conducted an interview with you 
regarding the incident and where your pants had fallen down in the 
presence of Soper. 
Corporal Rosen: Right. 
Sgt. Cole: And at the very end of that, I gave you a directive. Do you 
remember what that was? 
Corporal Rosen: I don't. Basically what I recall was you said that to have 
no - to not talk about if or have any dealings with it, and that the chief 
would get back with me on it and explain what was going to happen from 
there as far as that. 
Sgt. Cole: Okay. You don't remember I said to you, you shouldn't talk to 
Christy unless it's business, professional, at a professional level? 
Corporal Rosen: Right, yes. 
Sgt. Cole: Do you remember that? 
Corporal Rosen: Right. 
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[R. 59: 175-176] 
The next day, February 12th, Rosen delivered a memo to Sgt. Cole in 
which he stated, 
I'd like to repeat the fact that during the January IA (11-003), you advised 
me to "not discuss the details of the investigation" with her (Cristy), or have 
any conversation with her about the incident. You said she was "sensitive" 
at the time, and that I should only communicate with her "professionally" as 
needed, until the conclusion of the IA. 
[Ex. 14 at R. 37] 
Although Rosen acknowledged that Sgt. Cole gave him an order to have 
only professional contact with Soper, Rosen continued to contact Soper for 
personal reasons. 
A. The Circus Tickets 
On January 25 or 26, 2011, and while the first phase of the IA investigation 
was ongoing, Rosen left circus tickets - a family pass - for Soper in her mailbox 
at work with a hand-written note that said, "sorry so late, enjoy." [R. 59:71-72; 
Ex. 3] Rosen obtained these tickets through his second job as a weekend on-air 
talent for KUBL, a local radio station. [R. 59:194, 199, 322-323; Ex. 7 at R. 11] 
Rosen admitted leaving the circus tickets and the hand-written note. 
[R. 59:322] He justified this contact by claiming that Soper had asked him for 
tickets to a different show the previous fall. Because he could not provide her 
with the tickets she previously had requested, Rosen got Soper tickets for the 
circus. [R. 59:322-324] Rosen admitted, however, that at least two other shows 
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had occurred between October and February to which he could have gotten 
tickets for Soper but claimed he chose the circus because that is what she had 
gone to the last time. [R. 59:438] 
Soper testified that, when they very first started working for the City (four 
years earlier), Rosen had brought circus tickets and that several employees took 
them, including her. [R. 59:107, 302] She denied, however, that she had ever 
asked Rosen for tickets to any event and said she certainly had not asked for 
tickets to the circus in the preceding weeks and months before the pants 
dropping incident. [R. 59:73, 107] 
Soper testified that, when she received the tickets, she felt that Rosen was 
trying to give her a gift to make her complaint go away and that she thought it 
was tasteless. [R. 59:73] Soper showed the tickets to Ms. Wright, her supervisor. 
Ms. Wright told her to make sure Sgt. Cole was aware of it. [R. 59:73, 142] 
B. The ErnaSi Contact 
Rosen also sent Soper a personal email. On January 26, 2011, Soper sent 
an email to approximately 20 officers regarding a license plate that had been left 
on the counter at the records room. [R. 59:75, 78] The email stated, 
Hi ya'll, 
There was a license plate left at the front counter. If you left if there will you 
instruct me on what you want me to do with it. 
Thanks and having a smashing day!!!! 
[Ex. 3 at R. 4; R. 59:76-77] 
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Only one officer responded to the email - Rosen - and he responded only 
to Soper. [R. 59:78] Sent from his iPhone, Rosen's response read: 
Omgosh!!! That's hysterical! I figured we could leave it there to see how 
long it would be before it starts to disintegrate!? You have a "smashing" 
day too- thanks for the smile! 
[Ex. 3 at R. 4; R. 59:76-77] 
Rosen's response provided no information about the license plate, and 
because it included a phrase Soper frequently uses, she felt Rosen was 
harassing and mocking her. [R. 59:77, 80] 
III. The January 31st Apology Attempt 
When Chief Hicken delivered the verbal reprimand to Rosen on 
January 28th, he was not aware of the circus ticket or the personal email 
incidents. [R. 59:250-251, 430] At that meeting, Rosen asked Chief Hicken if he 
could apologize to Soper. [R. 59:277-278] Chief Hicken responded, 
I said make it very casual. I even gave the words - I don't know the exact 
words, but something similar to just walk up and say I'm sorry it happened, 
it will never happen again. And that should be the end of it. 
[R. 59:278] 
On January 31st, Rosen went to the records area at the front counter at 
about 5:40 pm. He hung around for about 20 minutes, engaging in small talk with 
Ms. Wright, who was sitting next to Soper. [R. 59:144-147] Ms. Wright observed 
that Soper was very uncomfortable. [R. 59:146] At 5:55 pm, Soper finally got up 
to close the lobby door and then went into the bathroom. [R. 59:145] At that 
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point, Rosen told Ms. Wright that he wanted to talk to her and Soper. Ms. Wright 
and Rosen walked back to Ms. Wright's office. [R. 59:148] Ms. Wright went to the 
bathroom and told Soper that Rosen wanted to talk to them. Soper responded 
that she just could not do it. [R. 59:148-149] Ms. Wright told Rosen that Soper did 
not want to talk to him. [R. 59:149] Because Chief Hicken had told Rosen he 
could apologize, Rosen was not reprimanded for this encounter. [R. 59:293] 
IV. The Second Phase of the Internal Affairs Investigation 
Chief Hicken testified that after he gave Rosen the verbal warning about 
the pants dropping incident, he spoke with Soper. [R. 59:251] At that time, Soper 
told him that other issues had gone on about which the Chief was not aware. 
Chief Hicken, who was leaving to go out of town, told Soper that he would 
address the issues when he returned on Monday. [R. 59:251-252] 
Chief Hicken subsequently ordered Sgt. Cole to investigate the contact 
that occurred after the pants dropping incident. Sgt. Cole testified that he 
believed the order for the second phase, or the "addendum," investigation 
occurred on January 31st and certainly prior to the KUBL / River Dance incident 
that occurred later. Sgt. Cole reluctantly undertook the further investigation. 
[R. 59:190-192] 
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V. Rosen's Violation of Chief Hicken's No Contact Order 
After the January 31st failed apology, Ms. Wright told Chief Hicken that 
Rosen had attempted to meet with Soper and Ms. Wright, that it upset Soper, 
and that Soper did not want an apology. [R. 59:252-253] In response, on 
February 2, 2011, Chief Hicken met again with Rosen. At that meeting, he told 
Rosen not to try and apologize and gave him a direct order that he was to have 
no contact with Soper other than professional contact. [R. 59:253-254, 293] Chief 
Hicken testified that his professional contact only directive meant that Rosen 
could contact Soper about matters involving record issues or issues that would 
normally involve his work as a police officer and that anything else would be 
unacceptable. [R. 59:254] Chief Hicken also testified that there was no doubt in 
his mind that he told Rosen not to contact Soper at that time. [R. 59:296] 
A. The KUBL / River Dance Incident 
Despite Chief Hicken's order, Rosen again attempted to reach out to 
Soper. On February 5th, only three days after Chief Hicken's order, Rosen was 
doing his weekend job at KUBL. [R. 59:338-340] At that time, Rosen claims he 
had extra tickets for River Dance so he asked that two tickets be put in Soper's 
name and then requested four more tickets for two other co-workers, including 
Ms. Wright. [R. 59:339] Rosen admitted that he asked for the tickets for Soper 
because he "just wanted to do something nice for her" and felt like it would help 
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them move on from the incident. [R. 59:340-341, 447] Rosen admitted that Soper 
never asked for River Dance tickets. [R. 59:447] 
On Monday, February 7th, Rosen brought in food from Del Taco that he 
had picked up for a community event. He offered food to several people, 
including Soper, who declined. [R. 59:335-336] Sgt. Cole was present. [R. 59:94, 
336-337] After Sgt. Cole walked away, Rosen told Soper that she had won River 
Dance tickets. [R. 59:336-337] Rosen told the story as follows: 
The River Dance situation, again with the premise that I thought the other 
tickets were used. I thought at some point I'll have an opportunity maybe, 
because we're moving on and putting this whole thing behind us, it would 
be good to let her know that I got her some tickets, that I made a request 
for the three staff members to get River Dance tickets. 
It was another upcoming event. It occurred at the end of March, so we had 
plenty of time. And I just let her know, I said, hey, Christy, congratulations, 
you got tickets to River Dance. And she said no I didn't. And I said, yeah, 
you won them through K-Bull 93.1 didn't win any contest. Yeah, you're on 
the list, meaning through the station, I got her a pair of tickets for River 
Dance... . 
[R. 59:337-338] 
Soper testified that Rosen told her, 
At that time, he said to me, congratulations on the River Dance tickets. 
And I said what River Dance tickets. And he said, yeah, you won River 
Dance tickets. I said how could I win something I never put in for. And he 
said well, I saw it come across my screen, you won River Dance tickets. 
[R. 59:94; Ex. 11 at R. 23] Soper denied that she had entered a contest to win 
River Dance tickets. [R. 59:94-95] 
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After Rosen walked away, Soper told Ms. Wright about the conversation 
and expressed that she would be furious if her name was read over the radio. 
[R. 59:96] While Ms. Wright was standing there, Soper's cell phone and desk 
phone began to ring. Both her mother and aunt had called to tell her that her 
name had been read on KUBL and that she had won River Dance tickets and 
that she had five minutes to call back and claim the tickets. Soper also received 
text messages from several friends. [R. 59:96-97; Ex. 11 at R. 23] 
Soper called KUBL to find out how the station got her name. She spoke 
with Shuka Jackson. Mr. Jackson asked her if she knew someone by the name 
of Coyote McCoy, which is Rosen's name on the radio station. Soper responded 
that she worked with him. Mr. Jackson stated that it looked like Rosen put her 
name in for the tickets but, because she worked with Rosen, she was not eligible 
to win and he apologized. [R. 59:98-99] Soper immediately reported the incident 
to Sgt. Cole.4 [R. 59:99] 
4
 In response to an inquiry from Sgt. Cole during the second phase of the IA 
investigation, Tandy Baker, a representative of KUBL, sent an email to Sgt. Cole. 
The email read, 
In relation to your request about winner information concerning Cristy 
Soper, it has been brought to my attention that her name was read on 
KUBL by accident on Monday morning. One of our weekend on-air talents 
had mistakenly entered her name into the computer system for contest 
giveaways. He did this mistakenly, and should have just made a formal 
request for the tickets, as is usually the case. 
[Ex. 7 at R. 11] 
Brief of the Appellee - 16 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Chief Hicken considered Rosen's actions an absolute violation of his 
February 2nd order that Rosen was to have only professional contact with Soper. 
[R. 59:261-262] 
VI. Administrative Leave 
After the KUBL / River Dance incident, Chief Hicken met with Rosen and 
put him on administrative leave and told him to stay away completely and totally 
until this matter was resolved. [R. 59:254-255] 
At that time, and in conjunction with the second phase of the lA 
investigation, Chief Hicken sent two emails to Sgt. Cole. In the first email dated 
February 7, 2011, Chief Hicken stated, 
On Feb. 2nd I ordered Cpl. Rosen to have no further contact with Records 
Clerk Cristy Soper regarding the IA case in which he was disciplined for 
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer. 
I ordered him to have nothing but professional contact with her and nothing 
else. He said he wanted to "communicate with her" and to "resolve the 
issue." 
I specifically told him he could not "resolve" the issue as she wanted no 
apology or any other contact except for professional reasons. 
This was clear and unmistakable direction. 
Anything which falls outside "professional contact" can be considered a 
violation of a direct order. 
[Ex. 9 at R. 21] 
In the second email also dated February 7th, Chief Hicken wrote, 
On Feb. 7 @ 1400hrs. I put Cpl. Rosen on Paid Adm. Leave until the 
current Internal Affairs investigation is completed and the final conclusion 
is determined. 
I also gave additional restrictions that there is to be no contact, no gifts, no 
3rd party contacts or any other conduct which could be interpreted by 
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Records Clerk Soper as embarrassing, humiliating, or any other unwanted 
recognition of any kind. 
I do not know how I could have made it any clearer. 
[Ex. 10 at R. 22] 
Vli. The Demotion 
At the conclusion of the second phase of the IA investigation, which 
included the circus tickets, the email incident, and the KUBL / River Dance 
incident, Sgt. Cole concluded that Rosen had violated both his directive and 
Chief Hicken's order to have only professional contact with Soper and 
recommended that Rosen be demoted from corporal to top rank police officer. 
[Ex. 12 at R. 35] Sgt. Cole testified that, based on his investigation, he had lost 
faith in Rosen's ability to act as a supervisor. [R. 59:213] Agreeing with the 
recommendation, Chief Hicken demoted Rosen from a corporal to patrol officer 
rank. [Ex. 17 at R. 47] The demotion resulted in an annual reduction in pay of 
$9,256. [R. 59:303] 
Chief Hicken testified that, in making the demotion decision, he considered 
the totality of the incidents involving Rosen that reflected bad judgment, including 
a verbal reprimand he received in early January for a search that went beyond 
the necessary scope; the pants dropping incident and the bad judgment of 
adjusting a uniform with an open door with people coming around; the circus 
tickets and email incident in violation of Sgt. Cole's professional contact only 
order; and, finally, the KUBL / River Dance incident in violation of Chief Hicken's 
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professional contact only order. [R. 59:269] Chief Hicken testified he felt that 
Rosen's actions had a real, damaging impact on the police department. 
[R. 59:297] He also felt that a short-term suspension would not be appropriate 
because Rosen still would be in a position of guiding and leading others. 
[R. 59:297] 
VII. The Etrapioyee Appeal Board Affirmed the Chiefs Decision. 
Rosen appealed Chief Hicken's decision to the Board. After a two-day 
hearing, the Board upheld Chief Hicken's decision to demote Rosen. The Board 
determined that both Sgt. Cole and Chief Hicken had directed Rosen to have 
only professional contact with Soper, that Rosen had violated those orders by 
(1) giving Soper circus tickets, (2) responding with no legitimate purpose to the 
email about the license plate, and (3) the incident regarding the KUBL / River 
Dance tickets. The Board also found that Rosen's actions were insubordinate 
and caused disruption in the department. Finally, the Board concluded that the 
demotion of Rosen "was reasonable under the circumstances, and the discipline 
was warranted and supported by the evidence." [R. 57-58] 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. The Demotion Was Proportional to the Offense. 
In concluding that Rosen's demotion "was reasonable under the 
circumstances, and . . . was warranted" [R. 58 (emphasis added)], the Board 
Brief of the Appellee - 19 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
determined that the sanction was proportional and consistent with previous 
sanctions imposed by the City. See Guenon v. Midvale City, 2010 UT App 51, 
fl 14 ("For a sanction to be warranted, it must be both proportional to the charges 
and consistent with previous sanctions . . . ." (emphasis added)). This was a 
reasonable conclusion and was all that the Board was required to do. Indeed, the 
Board was not required to conduct a detailed analysis about the proportionality 
and consistency of Rosen's demotion because he did not demonstrate a prima 
facie case of disproportionality. 
Utah courts recognize that the appellant bears the burden to establish a 
prima facie case that the City's action was disproportionate or inconsistent. See 
Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm'n., 2000 UT App 235, fl 30. To carry this 
burden, the appellant must show "some[] meaningful disparity of treatment 
between [himself] and other similarly situated employees." Id. U 30. "Meaningful 
disparate treatment can only be found when similar factual circumstances led to 
a different result without explanation." Id. fl 31 (emphasis added). 
In this case, Rosen admitted that the factual circumstances of his case and 
charge of insubordination were different that those concerning other disciplined 
officers. Petr.'s Br. 12 nn. 1 & 2. Because he had not shown a meaningful 
disparity of treatment, Rosen did not carry his burden of establishing a prima 
facie case. Without a prima facie showing, the Board was not required to conduct 
a detailed analysis about the proportionality of the sanction imposed. See id. 
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fflj 27-33. Instead, the Board was required only to determine if the demotion was 
warranted under the circumstances and the decision was reasonable. The Board 
made this determination [R. 58]. Thus, the court should uphold the Board's 
decision. 
II. The Employee Appeal Board Was Wot Required to Draw an Adverse 
Inference. 
The Board did not abuse its discretion in declining to apply an adverse 
inference against the City based on the missing taped interview because such an 
inference is merely permissive and was not warranted in this case. Courts 
routinely recognize that application of an adverse inference is permissive, not 
mandatory. See, e.g., Testa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 173, 177 (1st Cir. 
1998) ("We have held with some regularity that a trier of fact may (but need not) 
infer from a party's obliteration of a document relevant to a litigated issue that the 
contents of the document were unfavorable to that party."); see also M.F.K. v. 
S.B. (In re A.F.K.), 2009 UT App 198,1f 14 n.10, 216 P.3d 980, cert, denied, 221 
P.3d 837 (Utah 2009) ("jWjhile a trial court may draw a negative inference 
we do not think it is mandatory that a trial court draw a negative inference 
(citation omitted)). 
In this case, the Board was informed that it could draw an adverse 
inference against the City because the recording of the January 19, 2011, 
conversation between Sgt. Cole and Rosen was missing. [R. 59:40-41]. But 
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because application of such an inference is permissive, the Board was not 
required to apply an inference in this case. Indeed, the Board acted within the 
bounds of reasonableness and rationality in declining to draw an adverse 
inference for two reasons. First, the Board's decision was reasonable in light of 
Rosen's multiple prehearing statements where he admitted that, during their 
January 19, 2011, meeting, Sgt. Cole directed him to "only communicate with 
[Soper] 'professionally.'" [R. 37; 59:176]. Second, the Board's decision was 
reasonable because applying an inference in this case would not mitigate any 
potential prejudice or deter the purposeful destruction of evidence by the entity 
that had exclusive control of that evidence. Indeed, because of Rosen's own 
statements, there was no prejudice from the missing evidence. Further, because 
multiple people, including Rosen, had access to the now-missing recording, it 
would not have been reasonable to draw an inference against the City. 
III. The Employee Appeal Board Did Not Exceed Its Authority in 
Receiving and Reviewing Certain Exhibits Before the Post-Discipline 
Hearing and Any Potential Error was Harmless. 
The Board did not exceed its authority or abuse its discretion in receiving 
and reviewing certain exhibits before the Board hearing. As an initial matter, 
Rosen cannot raise this issue on appeal because it was not preserved below. 
See In re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, fl 9, 21 P.3d. 680. In this case, Rosen did not 
preserve his argument that the Board exceeded its authority because he did not 
specifically raise this issue to the Board and did not introduce any supporting 
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evidence or relevant legal authority to support his claim. See 438 Main St. v. 
Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, U 51, 99 P.3d 801. 
Nonetheless, the Board did not exceed its authority in receiving and 
reviewing certain exhibits before the hearing. An appeal board exceeds its 
authority only when it acts outside the scope of the decision-making authority 
granted to it by statute, municipal ordinance, and municipal policy. See Howick v. 
Salt Lake City Employee Appeals Bd., 2009 UT App 334, fflf 13-14. In this case, 
the Board had statutory authority to "commence its investigation, take and 
receive evidence, and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the 
cause for the discharge, suspension, or transfer." UTAH CODE 
§ 10-3-1106(3)(b)(ii) (emphases added). Because of this grant of authority, the 
Board could receive and review the evidence to determine what evidence was 
admissible. 
Further, any error with the Board receiving and reviewing exhibits before 
the hearing was harmless. Indeed, at the hearing, the Board stated that it would 
exclude and not consider evidence of incidents prior to January 18, 2011. 
Because the Board did not consider this other evidence in reaching its 
conclusion, Rosen was not harmed even if the Board reviewed certain exhibits 
before the hearing. Accordingly, the court should reject Rosen's argument and 
uphold the Board's decision. 
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IV. The Board's Findings Are Supported By Substantial Evidence. 
There is substantial evidence to support the Board's decision that Sgt. 
Cole, on January 19th, and Chief Hicken, on February 2nd, instructed Rosen to 
have only professional contact with Soper. There also was substantial evidence 
for the Board to find (a) that Rosen violated Sgt. Cole's January 19th order by 
(i) delivering circus tickets with a hand-written note to Soper and (ii) responding 
to Soper's work-related email with a personal response and (b) that Rosen 
violated Chief Hicken's February 2nd professional contact only order by putting 
Soper's name in for River Dance Tickets and by communicating with her about 
those tickets. Based on those findings, the Board had sufficient evidence to 
support its decision that Rosen had violated more than one professional contact 
only order, that his actions had been disruptive to the department, and that 
demotion was appropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Employee Appeal Board's Decision to Demote Rosen Was 
Proportional and Appropriate for the Charge of Insubordination. 
On appeal, Rosen claims that the Board abused its discretion in upholding 
his demotion because the Board did not detail whether his sanction was 
proportionate to the charge of insubordination. See Petr.'s Br. 12-13. He also 
asserts that such a detailed proportionality analysis is necessary to file a 
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meaningful appeal of the Board's decision. See id. The court should reject this 
argument. 
First, the burden is on Rosen to establish a prima facie case that Chief 
Hicken acted inconsistently or disproportionately by imposing sanctions by 
presenting sufficient evidence from which the Board could reasonably find a 
relevant inconsistency. Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Sen/. Comm'n., 2000 UT App 
235, % 30. Thus, Rosen "must, at a minimum, carry the burden of showing some 
meaningful disparity of treatment between [himself] and other similarly situated 
employees." Id. "Meaningful disparate treatment can only be found when similar 
factual circumstances led to a different result without explanation." Id. % 31. Here, 
Rosen admitted that no factually similar circumstances existed between him and 
the other officers ever disciplined by the City. [R. 59:527] Because Rosen did not 
establish a prima facie case of inconsistency, the Board was not required to 
conduct a detailed analysis about the proportionality or consistency of the 
sanction imposed. See id. ^27-33. Instead, the Board was required only to 
determine if the demotion was warranted under all of the circumstances.5 
5
 Rosen did argue that his misconduct was not any worse than officers who failed 
to appear for a bench trial or driver's license hearing or who were caught 
watching videos with a trainee instead of working or who failed to file a report. 
[R. 527-528] But Rosen's position is tantamount to arguing that the Board should 
substitute its judgment for that of Chief Hicken. [See R. 530] That is not the 
Board's province. Rather, it is Rosen's burden to show inconsistency based on 
similar factual circumstances. See Kelly, 2000 UT App. 235, *[J 31. Rosen has 
pointed to no other discipline that involved facts remotely similar to those 
involving Rosen or a charge against him. The City "'does not carry the burden of 
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Second, contrary to Rosen's assertion, the Board did all that it was 
required to do when it concluded that Rosen's demotion "was reasonable under 
the circumstances, and the discipline was warranted and supported by the 
evidence." [R. 58 (emphasis added)]. 
Indeed, in concluding that the discipline was "warranted," the Board 
conducted a proportionality analysis. This court has recognized that "[f]or a 
sanction to be warranted, it must be both 'proportional' to the charges and 
'consistent with previous sanctions imposed by the [Department pursuant to its 
own policies.'" Guenon v. Midvale City, 2010 UT App 51, fl 14 (emphasis added) 
(quoting Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 2000 UT App 235, U 21). 
Here, the demotion was proportional and consistent. 
At the hearing, the City introduced a summary of disciplinary actions taken 
against its police officers since its inception in 2007. [Ex. 15 at R. 42] Chief 
Hicken testified that there have been 43 disciplinary actions, including both 
citizen complaints and internal issues. [R. 59: 255] He testified that most of the 
internal affairs investigations involved vehicle damage and lost property damage. 
[R. 59:257] Some involved failures to appear at a driver's license hearing and at 
a bench trial, one involved failure to file a report, and one involved watching 
persuasion as to the nonexistence of a disparity,' rather, the burden to show the 
existence of disparity remains with [Rosen]." Id. <[} 33 (citation omitted). Rosen's 
attempt to argue that the other officer disciplinary actions "were just as bad" fails 
to meet that burden. 
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videos while on duty. [Ex. 15 at R. 42] Rosen offered no independent evidence, 
instead relying on the evidence offered by the City [R. 59:281-285, 478-485] 
Most of the disciplinary action involved verbal and written reprimands. [Ex. 
15 at R. 42] Chief Hicken testified, however, that two involved termination - one 
for incompetence (failure in writing reports after several warnings) and one of a 
probationary employee who was discussing engaging in possible criminal 
conduct while off duty. [R. 59:257-58]. 
Chief Hicken acknowledged that no other officer had ever been demoted. 
[R. 256] However, he also testified that, in the history of the department (which 
started in 2007), he had never dealt with anything factually similar to the situation 
with Rosen. [R. 59:257] He testified that he had never had to deal with a situation 
involving an officer violating orders or other insubordination. [R. 59:258, 487] 
Chief Hicken further testified that he had never had another situation at the City 
that was as disruptive as that caused by Rosen's actions. [R. 59:488] He also 
testified that the situation threw the whole department into internal disruption 
because he had a records clerk who was very upset and officers not paying 
attention to their service commission because they were too internally focused 
and preoccupied with the situation. [R. 59: 259-260]. He also testified that he had 
never had a situation where the actions of one employee affected the ability of 
another to do her job. [R. 59: 298] 
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When discussing why he chose demotion rather than a lesser form of 
discipline, Chief Hicken acknowledged that his possible range of discipline 
includes counseling, a supervisor's log, an action plan, additional training, verbal 
warnings, written warnings, suspension, demotion, and termination. [R. 59: 256] 
He testified that he chose demotion in this instance because anything less left 
Rosen in a position of leadership and directing others. Chief Hicken testified, 
Q. (By Ms. Jarvis, attorney for the City) So the question I'm sure that 
the defense table has is how did you go from verbal, written to 
demotion as opposed to time off, or what was it about this demotion 
that you felt that you were doing that was appropriate for the 
circumstances? 
A. (by Chief Hicken) Well, it's not unusual in police work - progressive 
discipline doesn't mean that you have to do something terrible three 
or four times before you get demoted or terminated. You could have 
a perfectly clear record for 20 years and find yourself demoted or 
terminated. I've seen that happen many times in any career. In this 
particular case, there wasn't any prior history, and I didn't expect it to 
get worse, but it really did. 
And as I previously mentioned, I listened carefully to Sergeant 
Cole's recommendation. I read the investigation, including the 
responses from Aaron, and I saw the damage that this had done to 
the police department. 
I expect supervisors to set the example, to keep the ship going 
straight and not have us get deviated, and it just immediately moved 
up to that level. That's all I can say. 
Q. (By Ms. Jarvis) Based on your experience as a police officer, did you 
trust Aaron to continue to make supervisory decisions based on 
this? 
A. (By Chief Hicken) No. After all this had happened, I had real 
concerns that because I didn't, you know, say you can't give gifts, 
and you can't do this, and you can't do that, it was almost like he 
was trying to circumvent the order. And I would expect a supervisor, 
especially, to set the example in that area and to just leave it alone. 
Brief of the Appellee - 28 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. (By Ms. Jarvis) Okay. 
A. (By Chief Hicken) And it became an issue where -1 don't think it's 
just me. I think that there's some trust issues with subordinates as 
well and, you know, that needs to be earned. And you can earn it for 
a long time and then lose it really fast by making bad decisions, and 
these were bad decisions. 
Q. (By Ms. Jarvis) So it's those bad decisions that resulted in the 
demotion? 
A. (By Chief Hicken) Yes, the totality of them all, yes. 
[R. 59: 267-268] 
As this court has stated, 
In determining whether the charges warrant the disciplinary action taken, 
we acknowledge that discipline imposed for employee misconduct is within 
the sound discretion of the Chief. The Chief must have the ability to 
manage and direct his officers, and is in the best position to know whether 
their actions merit discipline. 
Kelly v. Salt Lake City Serv. Comm'n, 2000 UT App 235, % 22 (quoting In re 
Discharge of Jones, 702 P.2d 1356, 1363 (Utah 1986)). This court has stated 
that it will not set aside an employee appeal board's approval of a chief's 
decision unless "the punishment imposed is in excess of 'the range of sanctions 
permitted by statute or regulation, or if, in light of all the circumstances, the 
punishment is disproportionate to the offense.'" Guenon v. Midvale City, 2010 UT 
App 51, H14. 
Recognizing the deference owed to Chief Hicken's decision, and based on 
the record as a whole, the Board met its obligation to determine if (a) the facts 
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supported the charge and (b) the charges warranted the sanction imposed. In its 
decision, the Board found that Rosen dropped his pants in front of a co-worker 
(paragraphs 1 & 2), that he received a verbal warning in another IA investigation 
(paragraph 3), that he violated a professional contact only order from Sgt. Cole 
with respect to both the circus tickets and the email (paragraph 7), and that he 
violated a professional contact order from Chief Hicken with respect to the KUBL 
/ River Dance incident (paragraphs 11-13). The Board also determined that 
Rosen's actions were disruptive to the department (paragraphs 4 & 16). Based 
on those findings, the Board concluded that 
Officer Rosen's performance history included at least two IA 
investigations resulting in verbal counseling for violations of the 
Department's Rules and Regulations. His subsequent failure to follow 
specific instructions and the Chiefs direct orders to leave his co-worker 
alone and to limit his contact with her to professional contact only is 
insubordination, which is a serious offense. Officer Rosen's conduct 
created a significant disruption within the Department, and it further 
illustrates his poor judgment, and an inability to lead others by his 
example. The [Board] therefore agrees with the Chiefs decision to 
discipline and demote Officer Rosen. 
[R. at 52-58] 
The Board met its obligation here to (a) determine if the facts supported 
the charge and (b) if the charges warranted the sanction imposed. It was not 
required to conduct a detailed proportionality analysis, and its decision that the 
sanction was reasonable and warranted should be upheld. 
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II. The Employee Appeal Board Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In 
Declining to Draw an Adverse inference Against the City Because 
Such an inference is lierely Permissive and Was Not Warranted in 
this Case. 
On January 19, 2011, in the police department's interview room, Sgt. Cole 
informed Rosen about the IA investigation. [R. 59:166-167] The audio and visual 
recording equipment in the interview room activates automatically, and Sgt. Cole 
believed the interview was recorded. [R. 59:167] During that interview, Sgt. Cole 
gave Rosen the first instruction that he was to have only professional contact 
with Soper. Rosen subsequently asked Sgt. Cole for a copy of the recording, but 
Sgt. Cole was not able to locate it. [R. 52: 167-168; 315-316] 
Rosen contends that because the City could not produce the audio 
recording of his January 19, 2011, conversation with Sgt. Cole, the Board was 
required to grant him a favorable inference regarding the contents of that 
conversation. See Pefr.'s Br. 18. Specifically, he argues that the Board should 
have adopted the inference that, during their meeting, Sgt. Cole did not issue a 
directive for Rosen to have only "professional contact" with Soper. See id. 
Contrary to Rosen's position, however, the Board was not required to adopt an 
adverse inference against the City because such inferences are permissive, not 
mandatory. Further, the Board did not abuse its discretion in declining to draw an 
adverse inference in this case because such an inference was not warranted. 
Utah law allows that when a party willfully or negligently loses evidence 
relevant to a litigated issue, the trier of fact may be informed that it can draw an 
Brief of the Appellee - 31 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
adverse inference against the negligent party regarding the contents of the 
missing evidence. See Kilpatrick v. Bullough Abatement, Inc., 2008 UT 82, fl 39, 
199 P.3d 957 ("[T]he only fair way to address the missing evidence is to direct 
the fact-finder that the defendants are entitled to a favorable inference in place of 
the missing evidence."). Indeed, informing the trier about the availability of an 
adverse inference mitigates potential prejudice that may arise from the missing 
evidence and deters those with exclusive control of the evidence from benefitting 
due to the destruction of that evidence. See id. 
But even when the trier of fact has been informed about the availability of 
an adverse inference, the trier may nonetheless refuse to apply that inference. 
See Testa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 173, 177 (1st Cir. 1998). This is 
because the decision to draw an adverse inference is permissive, not mandatory. 
See id. ("We have held with some regularity that a trier of fact may (but need not) 
infer from a party's obliteration of a document relevant to a litigated issue that the 
contents of the document were unfavorable to that party."); Bass-Davis v. Davis, 
134 P.3d 103, 107 (Nev. 2006) ("An inference is permissible, not required, and it 
does not shift the burden of proof."). Indeed, Utah courts have declined to 
mandate adverse inferences that arise in other contexts. See, e.g., M.F.K. v. S.B. 
(In re A.F.K.), 2009 UT App 198, fl 14 n.10 ("[W]hile a trial court may draw a 
negative inference . . . , we do not think it is mandatory that a trial court draw a 
negative inference." (citation omitted)). 
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Because the decision of whether to apply an adverse inference is 
permissive, not mandatory, the Board has discretion to refuse to apply such an 
inference. See Testa, 144 F.3d at 107. For the Board to abuse its discretion, the 
decision must "exceed[] the bounds of reasonableness and rationality." Guenon 
v. Midvale City 2010 UT App 51, 1f 4. 
In this case, it is undisputed that the Board was informed that it could draw 
an adverse inference against the City because the recording of the January 19, 
2011, conversation between Sgt. Cole and Rosen was missing. [R. 59:40-41] 
But once the Board was informed about the availability of such an inference, it 
was not required to apply that inference. 
Indeed, the Board acted within the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality in declining to draw an adverse inference for two reasons. First, the 
Board's decision was reasonable in light of Rosen's own prehearing statements 
concerning the contents of his January 19, 2011, conversation with Sgt. Cole. 
Second, the Board's decision was reasonable because applying an inference in 
this case would not promote the policy considerations behind such inferences. 
A. The Employee Appeal Board's Decision Was Reasonable In 
Light of Rosen's Own Prehearing Statements Concerning the 
Contents of His January 19, 2011, Conversation with Sgt Cole. 
The Board did not abuse its discretion in declining to draw an adverse 
inference against the City because Rosen's own prehearing statements 
confirmed that he was given a directive to have only "professional contact" with 
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Soper. In order to prove the contents of the January 19, 2011, conversation, the 
City introduced Sgt. Cole's investigative notes, his testimony, and Rosen's own 
prehearing statements about the contents of that conversation.6 
As part of his testimony, Sgt. Cole stated that during the January 19, 2011, 
conversation, he directed Rosen to "only have professional contact" with Soper. 
[R. 59:173] In addition, Sgt. Cole's investigative notes stated that during a 
subsequent interview, "Rosen hesitated about whether he remembered the 
directive . . . given [to] him [on January 19, 2011], which stated he should only 
have 'professional contact' with C. Soper until things 'cooled off.' Rosen finally 
admitted he remembered the directive." [Ex. 13 at R. 32 (emphasis added)] 
6
 In his brief, Rosen argues that the City could not "substitute] the [audio 
recording] with the testimony of witnesses" because the rules of evidence require 
an original writing, recording, or photograph in order to prove its contents. Petr.'s 
Br. 17-18 (citing UTAH R. EVID. 1002 & 1004). And he asserts that the policy 
considerations behind the rules of evidence "apply equally to appeal board 
hearings." Id. The court should reject this argument for two reasons. First, as 
recognized by Rosen, the rules of evidence are not applicable to an employee 
appeal board hearing. See id. at 18. Second, even if the rules of evidence were 
applicable, the facts of this case do not trigger the "best evidence" rule on which 
Rosen relies. In this case, the City did not seek to prove the contents of the audio 
recording. Instead, the City sought to prove the contents of the conversation 
between Rosen and Sgt. Cole. This distinction is significant because the "best 
evidence" rule does not apply when a witness has personal knowledge about a 
matter independent of a writing, recording, or photograph. See Roods v. Roods, 
645 P.2d 640, 642 (Utah 1982). In such situations, the witness may testify and 
the best evidence rule is not implicated. See id. Because Sgt. Cole had personal 
knowledge about the directive he gave Rosen, and because Rosen had personal 
knowledge about the directive he received, it was appropriate for the City to 
introduce their testimonies to prove the contents of the conversation at issue. 
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Although Rosen now argues that, in the January 19, 2011, conversation, 
he was never directed to have only "professional contact" with Soper, see Petr.'s 
Br. 15, his prehearing statements directly contradict this assertion. For example, 
the City provided an audio recording of a February 11, 2011, interview between 
Sgt. Cole and Rosen where Rosen stated that during their January 19, 2011, 
conversation, he remembered being given the directive not to contact Soper 
"unless it's business, professional, at a professional level." [R. 59:176] In 
addition, the City introduced a memorandum Rosen wrote to Sgt. Cole following 
their February 11th meeting. [Ex. 15 at R. 36] In that memorandum, Rosen wrote 
that during their January 19, 2011, conversation, Sgt. Cole advised him that 
Soper "was 'sensitive' at the time, and that [he] should only communicate with 
her 'professionally' as needed, until the conclusion of the [investigation]." [Ex. 14 
at R. 37 (emphasis added)] Further, the City introduced a letter Rosen wrote to 
his fellow officers in which he stated that the reason for his demotion "was 
because of MY DOING" and "because of ME (and no one else)." [Ex. 22 at R. 51] 
Based on these statements, Rosen's accounting of the January 19, 2011, 
conversation mirrored the accounting of Sgt. Cole, such that there was no 
dispute about the directive Rosen received. Because Rosen's own prehearing 
statements confirmed that he was directed to "only communicate with [Soper] 
'professionally,'" [Ex. 14 at R. 37], the Board's decision not to apply an adverse 
inference did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness or rationality. Thus, the 
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Board did not abuse its discretion in declining to draw an adverse inference 
against the City simply because the audio recording of that conversation was 
unavailable. 
B. The Employee Appeal Board Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 
Declining to Draw an Adverse Inference Against the City 
Because Applying an Inference in this Case Would Not Promote 
the Policy Considerations Behind Adverse Inferences. 
Because application of an adverse inference in this case would not 
promote the policy considerations behind applying such inferences, the Board did 
not abuse its discretion in declining to draw an adverse inference against the 
City. As discussed above, the availability of an adverse inference promotes two 
important policy considerations. See Kilpatrick, 2008 UT 82, fl 39. First, it 
mitigates potential prejudice that may arise from the missing evidence. See id. 
Second, it deters those with exclusive control of evidence from purposefully 
destroying that evidence. See id. 
In this case, however, application of an adverse inference against the City 
does not promote either of these policy considerations. For example, Rosen's 
own prehearing statements about the contents of his January 19, 2011, 
conversation with Sgt. Cole eliminate any potential prejudice from the failure to 
produce a recording of that conversation. See supra Argument, Part II.A. As 
discussed above, Rosen admitted that Sgt. Cole directed him to "only 
communicate with [Soper] 'professionally.'" [R. 37] Because this accounting of 
the conversation mirrored the account of Sgt. Cole [R. 32, R. 59:176-177], there 
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was no dispute about the directive given Rosen at that meeting. Thus, the 
missing audio recording was irrelevant, and Rosen was not prejudiced by its 
absence. 
In addition, evidence that the audio recording was not in the City's 
exclusive control eliminates the deterrence policy consideration for adverse 
inferences. When either party may be responsible for losing or destroying the 
evidence, and there is no indication as to how the evidence was lost, punishing 
just one party does not fully deter the purposeful destruction of evidence. In this 
case, multiple people, including Rosen, had access to the now-missing 
recording. [R. 59:40] In addition, there was no indication of how the audio 
recording was lost. Based on these facts, application of an adverse inference 
against just one party would not serve as a deterrent for purposefully destroying 
evidence. 
In sum, Rosen was afforded a remedy when the Board was informed that it 
could draw an adverse inference against the City due to the missing audio 
recording. But once informed, the Board was not required to adopt the adverse 
inference because such inferences are permissive, not mandatory. And the 
Board did not abuse its discretion in declining to draw the adverse inference 
because such an inference was not warranted in light of Rosen's own prehearing 
statements and because application of an inference would not promote the policy 
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considerations behind adverse inferences. For these reasons, the court should 
reject Rosen's argument and uphold the Board's final order. 
III. The Employee Appeal Board Did Not Exceed Its Authority or Abuse 
Its Discretion in Receiving and Reviewing Certain Exhibits Before the 
Hearing. 
Rosen makes two arguments concerning the Board's receipt of the City's 
exhibits. First, he claims that the Board exceeded its authority in receiving and 
reviewing certain exhibits before the hearing.7 See Petr.'s Br. 19-20. Second, he 
asserts that the Board abused its discretion in receiving and reviewing material 
that "had not been identified by the City as bases for the demotion at issue." 
Petr.'s Br. 20. The court should reject both of these assertions because Rosen 
failed to preserve his argument that the Board exceeded its authority and any 
error regarding the content of the material was harmless. 
Regarding his first assertion, Rosen did not preserve the argument that the 
Board exceeded its authority. To preserve an issue for appeal, a party must 
present the issue "to the trial court in such a way that the trial court ha[d] an 
opportunity to rule on that issue." 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, 
fl 51. This is because "the preservation requirement is based on the premise that 
7
 As an initial matter, it is unclear how Rosen's argument relates to the Board's 
final action or order. This is significant because the Utah Court of Appeals has 
appellate jurisdiction to review only "[a] final action or order of the appeal board." 
UTAH CODE § 10-3-1106(6)(a). Because the court may review only a final action 
or order, the court does not have jurisdiction to review the Board's preliminary or 
non-final decisions. For purposes of this brief, however, the City will assume that 
Rosen's argument about the timing of the receipt of the exhibits is somehow 
related to the Board's final order. 
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in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court ought to be given an 
opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it." Pratt v. 
Nelson, 2007 UT 41, % 15, 164 P.3d 366. Tor a trial court to be afforded an 
opportunity to correct the error (1) the issue must be raised in a timely fashion[,] 
(2) the issue must be specifically raised[,] and (3) the challenging party must 
introduce supporting evidence or relevant legal authority." 438 Main St., 2004 UT 
72, ff 51 (alterations in original). When a party does not fulfill these preservation 
requirements, it cannot raise the issue on appeal. See In re E.R., 2001 UT App 
66, If 9. 
In this case, Rosen did not preserve his argument that the Board exceeded 
its authority in receiving and reviewing the City's exhibits before the hearing 
because he did not specifically raise this argument to the Board and did not 
introduce any supporting evidence or relevant legal authority to support his claim. 
When objecting to the contents of the exhibits, Rosen's counsel remarked, "[A]s I 
understand it, by the way, the Board has already received the [C]ity materials like 
a month ago, so you're familiar with the facts. Is that true by the way? Is that on 
the record? Yes?" [R. 59:16] After confirming that the Board had received the 
material before the hearing, Rosen's counsel made no assertion that the Board 
had exceeded its authority or that it had erred in receiving the materials before 
the hearing. [R. 59:10-38] In addition, Rosen's counsel did not introduce any 
supporting evidence or legal authority regarding the Board's authority. 
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Because Rosen did not specifically raise his argument and did not cite any 
supporting evidence or legal authority, the Board was not made aware of any 
potential error and was not given an opportunity to correct any claimed error. 
Thus, Rosen's argument was not preserved and cannot be raised for the first 
time on appeal.8 See In re E.R, 2001 UT App 66, fl 9. 
Regarding his second assertion, Rosen made a motion to exclude certain 
evidence, arguing that the City could not bring in incidents that occurred prior to 
January 18, 2011. [R. 59:10-13] The City countered that it intended to introduce 
incidents that occurred in October and November to counter Rosen's claim that 
the pants dropping incident was accidental. [R. 59:13-14]. In the course of that 
argument, Rosen raised his concern that the Board had received exhibits about 
his prior conduct approximately 30 days earlier. [R. 59:16] Rosen then objected 
to the content of those exhibits as irrelevant. 
8
 Regardless of whether Rosen properly preserved this argument, the Board did 
not exceed its authority in issuing its order even though the Board received and 
reviewed certain exhibits before the hearing. An appeal board exceeds its 
authority when it acts outside the scope of the decision-making authority granted 
to it by statute, municipal ordinance, and municipal policy. See Howick v. Salt 
Lake City Employee Appeals Bd., 2009 UT App 334, ffl] 13-14. In this case, the 
Board had statutory authority to "commence its investigation, take and receive 
evidence, and fully hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for 
the discharge, suspension, or transfer." UTAH CODE 10-3-1106(3)(b)(ii) 
(emphases added). Under this grant of authority, the Board could "take and 
receive evidence" and "fully determine the matter" of Rosen's demotion. Thus, 
the Board did not act outside the scope of its authority in receiving and reviewing 
the evidence or determining what evidence was admissible. Accordingly, the 
court should reject Rosen's argument that the Board exceeded its authority in 
issuing its final order. 
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The City ultimately stipulated that it would not bring in evidence of 
incidents that occurred prior to January 2011. [R. 59: 37] Rosen agreed that the 
City's stipulation was consistent with what he wanted. [R. 59:37] The Board 
consistently refused to allow evidence from incidents prior to January 2011, 
including some evidence that Rosen tried to offer. [R. 59:105-107; 305-309] The 
Board determined that, while it needed to consider the totality of the 
circumstances, incidents that occurred prior to January 2011 were not relevant 
and would not be considered. [R. 59: 26-37] Because the Board determined not 
to consider any evidence regarding Rosen's pre-January 2011 conduct, any error 
in receiving and reviewing the material before the hearing was harmless. 
In sum, the Board did not exceed its authority in receiving the City's 
exhibits, and any error in reviewing the contents of the exhibits, if any, was 
harmless. For these reasons, the court should uphold the Board's final order. 
IV. The Board's Findings Were Sypported by Substantia! Evidence. 
A. Rosen Understood Sgt Cole's January 19th Directive to Have 
Only Professional Contact with Soper. 
Rosen argues that Sgt. Cole's instruction to him in their first interview was 
nothing more than advice or a recommendation, not an order. See Petr.'s Br. at 
24. Rosen's argument ignores the evidence. First, Rosen focuses on one 
statement from Sgt. Cole's testimony. Petr.'s Br. at 22. But during that same line 
of questioning, Sgt. Cole also testified, 
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I told him that Christy had - was upset. . . [and] that she shouldn't be 
contacted. A formal complaint had come in, and until we were done with 
this, there was to be no contact with her except for professional contact. 
[R. 59:177] 
Second, Rosen misquotes in his brief [Petr.'s Br. at 22-23]9 or ignores his 
subsequent communications with Sgt. Cole where he confirms he understood 
that he was to have only professional contact with Soper. Rosen references the 
interview between Rosen and Sgt. Cole that occurred on February 11th. The 
actual quote reads, 
Sgt. Cole: We'll be discussing an IA that had been done previous. Aaron, 
in the internal affairs investigation, I conducted an interview with you 
regarding the incident and where your pants had fallen down in the 
presence of Soper. 
Corporal Rosen: Right. 
Sgt. Cole: And at the very end of that, I gave you a directive. Do you 
remember what that was? 
Corporal Rosen: I don't. Basically what I recall was you said that to have 
no - to not talk about it or have any dealings with it, and that the chief 
would get back with me on it and explain what was going to happen from 
there as far as that. 
Sgt. Cole: Okay. You don't remember I said to you, you shouldn't talk to 
Christy unless it's business, professional, at the professional level? 
Corporal Rosen: Right, yes. 
Sgt. Cole: Do you remember that? 
9
 The City does not mean to imply that any misquote was intentional and raises it 
only because the misquote reasonably could be read to lessen the strength of 
Rosen's admission. 
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Corporal Rosen: Right. 
[R. 59: 175-176] 
Importantly, Rosen also fails to reference the memo that he sent to Sgt. 
Cole the day after their February 11th conversation. In that memo, Rosen states, 
I'd like to repeat the fact that during the January IA (11-003), you advised 
me to "not discuss the details of the investigation" with her (Cristy), or have 
any conversation with her about the incident. You said she was "sensitive" 
at the time, and that I should only communicate with her "professionally" as 
needed, until the conclusion of the I A. 
[Ex. 14 at R. 37 (emphasis added)] 
Despite his acknowledgment of Sgt. Cole's directive, Rosen argues that 
the Board should infer that no such directive was given because the recording of 
the January 19th conversation is missing. For the reasons discussed supra at 
Argument, Part II, Rosen's argument should be rejected. Further, there was 
substantial evidence before the Board to support its findings that Rosen received 
a directive from Sgt. Cole on January 19th that he was to have only professional 
contact with Soper. 
Rosen also argues that, even if Sgt. Cole gave him a professional contact 
only order, the Board should not have considered his January 26th email to Soper 
because it was not mentioned in the City's letter of intent to discipline.10 See 
10
 At the commencement of the hearing, Rosen argued that only those facts 
stated in the letter of intent to discipline should be introduced (i.e., the circus 
tickets and the KUBL / River Dance tickets). The City countered that it should be 
allowed to introduce any evidence relevant to those policy violations referenced 
in the letter of intent. [R. 59:10-18] The parties ultimately stipulated that only 
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Petr.'s Br. at 25. Rosen's argument is contrary to Utah law. In Lucas v. Murray 
City Civil Sen/. Comm'n, 949 P.2d 746 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the court stated 
that, as it relates to an employee's property interest in his job, due process 
requires oral or written notice of the charges, an explanation of the employer's 
evidence, an opportunity to respond to the charges in "something less" than a full 
evidentiary hearing before termination, coupled with a full post-termination 
hearing at a meaningful time. Id. at 754. In Lucas, the terminated officer argued 
that he received inadequate notice because he was not informed before his initial 
interview of the excessive force charge against him and because he was not told 
orally or in writing when the focus of the investigation turned to dishonesty. Id. at 
754. The court rejected the officer's argument because it was clear, from the 
totality of the investigation, that the officer was aware that both excessive force 
and dishonesty were part of the investigation. Id. at 755. 
There is no question here that Rosen was well aware that the email was 
part of the City's case. Sgt. Cole interviewed him about the email in the 
February 11, 2011, interview. [Ex. 13 at R. 32] Rosen himself addressed the 
email in his February 12, 2011, memo to Sgt. Cole. [Ex. 14 at R. 37]. Thus, 
evidence of matters that occurred from January 2011 forward would be admitted. 
[R. 59:37-38] The Board held the parties to that stipulation. [R. 59:105-107; 
305-309]. Rosen neither objected to the admission of the email (Exhibit 3) nor to 
the examination of Soper regarding it. [R. 59:75-79] Rosen therefore failed to 
preserve his objection. See supra, Argument, Part III. Rosen refers the court to 
R. 59:519 in support of his argument that he objected to the evidence. The 
reference, however, is to Rosen's closing statement, not to an actual objection. 
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Rosen was on notice that the email was part of the second phase of the IA 
investigation sufficient to satisfy due process. 
Further, in Ogden City Corp. v. Harmon, 2007 U i App 336, 171 P.3d 474, 
this court, in recognizing a prior remand in the same case, stated, 
The City argued that all of the incidents involving [the officer's] misbehavior 
were relevant and should have been considered by the Commission... 
We agreed with the City, . . . We instructed the Commission to explore on 
remand [the officer's] alleged misrepresentations and dishonest remarks, 
and to consider all of Harmon's inappropriate behavior in arriving at its 
conclusion. 
Id. If 4.11 See also, Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 2000 UT App 235 
% 24 (noting that court must review sanction in light of all the circumstances 
underlying the termination). 
Here, Rosen engaged in two actions within a week of Sgt. Cole's 
professional contact only order - the circus tickets and the personal email. Both 
should and were properly considered by the Board. 
In any event, while the Board issued a finding with respect to the email, the 
Board also held that Rosen had violated the professional contact only orders 
based on (1) the circus tickets and (2) the KUBL / River Dance ticket incidents. 
[Ex. 57] Thus, even if the email was improperly introduced, the Board did not err 
when it determined that Rosen had been insubordinate. 
11
 In Harmon, some of the issues that the court instructed the Commission to 
consider on remand had occurred several years earlier and had never been the 
subject of disciplinary action. See Harmon, 2007 UT App 336, % 2 and Ogden 
City Corp. v. Harmon, 2005 UT App 274, fff 3-6, 10-12, 116 P.3d 973, cert, 
denied, 125 P.3d 102 (Utah 2005) 
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B. Any Errors in the Board's Findings Were Harmless. 
Rosen next argues that the Board incorrectly found that (i) Sgt. Cole gave 
Rosen a second order to stay away from Soper and (ii) Chief Hicken issued a 
professional contact only order on January 28th, when he gave Rosen the verbal 
warning regarding the pants dropping incident. Petr.'s Br. at 27-28. The City does 
not dispute that Sgt. Cole gave only one directive to Rosen to have only 
professional contact with Soper - the directive that occurred on January 19th. The 
City likewise does not dispute that Chief Hicken did not give a professional 
contact only order when he issued the verbal warning on January 28th. Rather, 
Chief Hicken's professional contact only order occurred on February 2nd. Those 
errors by the Board, however, were harmless. 
First, the Board made no finding that Rosen violated either of (i) Sgt. 
Cole's alleged second order or (ii) Chief Hicken's alleged January 28th 
professional contact order. [R. at 55] Rather, in its findings, the Board makes 
reference only to (a) the circus tickets and personal email that occurred after Sgt. 
Cole's January 19th professional contact only order [R. at 54-55 (paragraphs 5 & 
7)] and (b) the KUBL / River Dance incident that occurred after Chief Hicken's 
February 2nd professional contact only order. [R. 55-56 (paragraphs 11-13)]. 
Because the Board did not find any specific violation of the other mistakenly 
alleged orders, the Board's findings as to those two orders are immaterial and 
harmless. 
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Second, the Board's decision is not dependent on whether there were two 
or four professional contact only orders. Rather, the Board's decision states, 
The testimony and other evidence submitted showed that Officer Rosen 
had received verbal counseling for his conduct regarding the pants 
incident, and that he was further instructed on more than one occasion by 
both Sgt. Cole and by Chief Hicken not to have contact with the co-worker 
other than "professional" contact. Officer Rosen nonetheless engaged in 
intentional contacts with the co-worker by giving her circus tickets, and his 
entry of the co-worker's name in a radio station contest for Riverdance 
tickets. These contacts made by Officer Rosen were of a personal nature 
and they were not "professional" contact with the co-worker. Rather, the 
contacts were made after he was instructed to limit his contacts to 
professional contacts only.... Officer Rosen acknowledged that although 
he was instructed to limit his contacts with the co-worker to professional 
contacts only, he failed to do s o . . . . 
Officer Rosen's performance history included at least two IA 
investigations resulting in verbal counseling for violations of the 
Department's Rules and Regulations. His subsequent failure to follow 
specific instructions and the Chief's direct orders to leave his co-worker 
alone and to limit his contact with her to professional contact only is 
insubordination, which is a serious offense. Officer Rosen's conduct 
created a significant disruption within the Department, and it further 
illustrates his poor judgment, and his inability to lead others by his 
example. 
[R. 57-58] 
In summary, even if the Board mistakenly found that Sgt. Cole and Chief 
Hicken each issued more than one professional contact only order, it is not 
material and was not harmful. In its decision, the Board simply noted that Rosen 
had been told on more than one occasion to have only professional contact with 
Soper - and that finding is accurate. Further, the violations on which the Board 
relied in its decision related to the personal email and circus ticket incidents that 
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occurred after Sgt. Cole's first professional contact only order of January 19 and 
the KUBL / River Dance incident that occurred after Chief Hicken's professional 
contact only order of February 2nd. The Board found that the circus and River 
Dance ticket incidents involved personal, not professional, contact and therefore 
violated orders from both Sgt. Cole and Chief Hicken. The Board made no finding 
of any other violation. Rosen's argument therefore should be rejected. 
C. Rosen's Actions in Submitting Soper's Name for River Dance 
Tickets Constituted Nonprofessional Contact. 
Finally, Rosen argues that he did not violate Chief Hicken's professional 
contact only order when he submitted Soper's name for River Dance tickets 
through his job at KUBL. According to Rosen, this action does not equate to 
"contact." See Petr.'s Br. at 28-29. 
Rosen's argument overlooks vital facts. First, on February 2nd, Chief 
Hicken told Rosen that Soper did not want an apology and instructed Rosen to 
have only professional contact with Soper. [R. 59:253-254, 293, 443] Chief 
Hicken testified, 
Q. (by Ms. Jarvis) I'm going to hand you what's been marked as City's 
Exhibit number 9. Do you recognize that particular document (inaudible?) 
A. (by Chief Hicken) Yes. 
Q. (by Ms. Jarvis) Can you tell us what it is? 
A. (by Chief Hicken) That was an e-mail that I sent letting [Sgt. Cole] 
know that I had talked to Aaron and said that, you know, we are not going 
to get resolution of this, I you know you want resolution, but you're not 
going to get it. She doesn't want to be apologized to. Leave it alone. 
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And at that point, I was trying to be as very clear and direct as I 
could possibly be that this included indirect, direct, on duty, off duty, leave 
it alone. 
[R. 59:253; Ex. 9 at R. 21] 
Nonetheless, three days later, Rosen used his position at KUBL to put 
Soper's name on two tickets for River Dance. [R. 59:337-339, 443-444] He 
admits that Soper did not ask for the tickets and that he just wanted to do 
something nice for her. [R. 59:340-341, 447] Rosen's reasoning flies directly in 
the face of Chief Hicken's instruction that Soper did not want an apology and 
Rosen needed to leave it alone. Finally, in addition to obtaining the tickets, 
Rosen engaged Soper in conversation about the tickets - telling her that she 
"won" River Dance tickets and, when she challenged how she could win tickets 
for which she did not enter, stating that he saw it come across his screen that 
she had won the tickets. [R. 59:94, 337-338, Ex. 11 at R. 23] 
Certainly Rosen's actions in obtaining River Dance tickets for Soper and 
then telling her she had "won" the tickets on KUBL constituted contact. Rosen's 
attempt to characterize it otherwise should be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the record as a whole, the Board found that Rosen received a 
directive from both Sgt. Cole and Chief Hicken to have professional contact only 
with Soper and that Rosen acted against those directives by continuing to 
contact Soper for personal reasons - specifically, the circus tickets, the personal 
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email, and the River Dance tickets. Based on these findings, the Board properly 
determined that Chief Hicken's decision to demote Rosen was appropriate to the 
offense, including the charge of insubordination. The Board also properly found 
that the demotion was proportional and consistent with previous sanctions 
imposed by the police department. In reaching that decision, the Board was 
required to give deference to Chief Hicken as he was in the best position to 
balance the competing concerns. The court should affirm the Board's decision 
because its determination was proportional and supported by substantial 
evidence and therefore did not exceed the bounds of reasonableness and 
rationality. 
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SARATOGA SPRINGS POLICE DEPARTMENT 
RULES AMD REGULATION 
PREFACE 
This Manual has been developed to assist us in fulfilling our purpose as a Police 
Service organization. Every person in this organization should know what is 
expected of them and how the organization regulates performance and conduct 
to allow for high-quality, professional police performance. 
We know the nature of the Police Service demands higher standards and more 
attention to organizational discipline than most other non-military organizations. 
We also know if rules and regulations are to be followed, they must be known by 
all members of the Department and they must be contemporary. 
This Manual, therefore, has been developed to meet today's professional and 
organizational needs related to employee relations and conduct. It shall be 
subject to change as these needs change. 
Since this Manual applies to all personnel of the Saratoga Springs Police 
Department, it is important everyone read, become knowledgeable of, and refer 
to its contents. 
GARY HICKEN 
Chief of Police 
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LAW ENFORCEMENT CODE OF ETHICS 
As a Law Enforcement Officer, my fundamental duty is to serve the community; 
to safeguard lives and property; to protect the innocent against deception, the 
weak against oppression or intimidation, and the peaceful against violence or 
disorder; and to respect the Constitutional rights of all to liberty, equality, and 
justice. 
I will keep my private life unsullied as an example to all and will behave in a 
manner that does not bring discredit to me or to my agency. I will maintain 
courageous calm in the face of danger, scorn, or ridicule; develop self-restraint 
and be constantly mindful of the welfare of others. Honest in thought and deed in 
both my personal and official life, I will be exemplary in obeying the law and the 
regulations of my Department. Whatever I see or hear of a confidential nature or 
that is confided to me in my official capacity will be kept ever secret unless 
revelation is necessary in the performance of my duty. 
I will never act officiously or permit personal feelings, prejudices, political beliefs, 
aspirations, animosities, or friendships to influence my decisions. With no 
compromise for crime and with relentless prosecution of criminals, I will enforce 
the law courteously and appropriately without fear or favor, malice or ill will, 
never employing unnecessary force or violence and never accepting gratuities. 
I recognize the badge of my office as a symbol of public faith, and I accept it as a 
public trust to be held so long as I am true to the ethics of police service. I will 
never engage in acts of corruption or bribery, nor will I condone such acts by 
other police officers. I will cooperate with all legally authorized agencies and their 
representatives in the pursuit of justice. 
I know that I alone am responsible for my own standard of professional 
performance and will take every reasonable opportunity to enhance and improve 
my level of knowledge and competence. 
I will constantly strive to achieve these objectives and ideals, dedicating myself 
before God to my chosen profession...Law Enforcement 
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2.0 PERSONAL CONDUCT 
Employees shall conduct themselves at all times, both on and off duty, 
in such a manner as to reflect favorably on the Department. Conduct 
unbecoming an employee shall include that which brings the 
Department into disrepute or reflects discredit upon the employee as a 
member of the Department or that which impairs the operation or 
efficiency of the Department or its employees. Sworn personnel are 
expected to conduct themselves as outlined in the Law Enforcement 
Code of Ethics. 
2.1 EMPLOYEE DEMEANOR 
Employees shall be courteous to the public and to each other. They 
shall be tactful in the performance of their duties, shall control their 
tempers, and exercise the utmost patience and discretion and not 
engage in argumentative discussions even in the face of provocation. 
In the performance of their duties, employees should not use coarse, 
violent, or profane language or gestures, and shall not express any 
prejudice concerning race, religion, politics, national origin, or other 
personally sensitive characteristics. 
2.2 LOYALTY 
Successful operations require employees to be loyal to the Department 
and their supervisors and ranking officers. Ranking officers must be able 
to trust their subordinates in carrying out their respective mission. Any 
personal conflicts inhibiting loyalty should be resolved as soon as 
possible. Respect must be earned, but loyalty is required. 
2.3 IMPARTIAL ATTITUDE - NON-DISCRIMINATION 
All employees must remain completely impartial toward persons 
coming to the attention of the Department. Violations of the law are 
against the people of the State, not against the individual employee. 
All citizens are guaranteed equal protection under the law. Exhibiting 
partiality for or against a person because of sex, race, creed, or influence 
is unethical. An act of interference in the private business of others, not 
in the interest of justice, which takes place under the cover of authority, is 
subject to disciplinary action. Employees shall not discriminate against 
any person on the basis of sex, race, color, age, or handicap. 
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2.20 BADGE/POLICE CREDENTIALS, USE OF 
Officers shall not lend or borrow another officer's badge without 
the approval of the officer's immediate supervisor. Officers shall 
not use another officer's identification, nor shall they permit any 
person not appointed to this Department to use a Saratoga Springs 
Police badge or official identification at any time. 
2.21 KEYS, DEPARTMEMTAL 
Departmental keys are issued only to employees according to 
their individual needs or job involvement. By no means can any 
keys be duplicated without approval of the Chief of Police, and, under 
circumstances, can an employee lend or furnish the Department 
keys to any person(s) not employed or having lawful business 
with this Department. Employees shall not possess a 
Departmental key or keys not officially issued to the individual. 
2.22 CRITICISM 
' All members of this Department shall conduct themselves in a 
manner which shall foster harmony and cooperation among all 
members of this Department. They shall not spread falsehoods 
about another member concerning his/her personal character or 
conduct. 
2.23 DETRIMENTAL GOSSIP 
No employee of this Department shall engage in discussion, 
whether spoken, written, or otherwise expressed, of a member 
of this Department concerning that member's personal character 
or conduct to the detriment of any such member, unless as 
required in the performance of duty. 
2.24 RESPECT 
Employees shall treat citizens and Departmental employees with 
courtesy and respect. All employees shall be addressed in a 
respectful manner at all times and shall refrain from being 
unreasonably critical or derogatory with regard to fellow 
employees. 
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DUTY REQUIREMENTS 
It shall be the duty and responsibility of each employee to fulfill to the 
greatest extent possible the functions of the Police Department and the 
division or unit to which he/she is assigned, and to perform any 
reasonable, lawful and proper duty assigned by a superior or specified by 
Department Rules and Regulations, laws, ordinances, and the Policy and 
Procedure Manual. The following sections are specific provisions related 
to duty requirements. However, they are not exhaustive. Circumstances 
may arise where sound judgment and discretion should be exercised. 
USE OF FORCE 
Physical force may be used to affect a lawful arrest or to restore/maintain 
order when actions of person(s) are a clear threat to the safety of others. 
Force may be used only when necessary and only that amount necessary 
to accomplish the lawful task is permittee!. Force beyond that which is 
necessary becomes punitive and is excessive. Excessive force is not 
permitted. 
COOPERATION 
Departmental personnel are responsible for fostering and maintaining a 
spirit of cooperation within the Department. Cooperation among the 
various units and bureaus is essential for effective Departmental 
performance and is to be maintained at all times. 
LAWS AND REGULATIONS, KNOWLEDGE OF 
Employees are required to establish and maintain a working knowledge of 
all laws and ordinances in force in the City of Saratoga Springs, the Rules 
and Regulations, procedural manuals, and policies of the Department, 
that affect their official duties. Additionally, sworn personnel shall maintain 
a working knowledge of the geographical layout of the City. In the event of 
action involving impropriety or breach of discipline, it will be presumed the 
employee was familiar with the law, rule, or policy. 
A. Establishing Elements of Violation 
Existence of facts establishing a violation of the Jaw, ordinance, or 
rule, is all that is necessary to support any allegation of such as a 
basis for a charge under this section. It is not necessary that a 
formal criminal complaint be filed or sustained. 
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3.12 REPORTING INFORMATION 
A. It shall be the duty of every member of this Department to properly 
report any information given in good faith by any citizen regarding 
matters which indicate the need for police action. A member shall 
supply information to persons requesting, courteously and 
accurately, providing the information requested is within the 
law and Departmental policy to disclose. 
B. Employees shall promptly submit such reports as required by the 
performance of their duties or by proper authority. 
3.13 WITHHOLDING CRIMINAL INFORMATION 
Employees receiving or possessing facts or information relative to a 
criminal offense or case shall not withhold such facts or information in 
conflict with Departmental procedure. However, no employee shall be 
required to waive his/her Constitutional rights or be disciplined as a result 
of asserting such rights. 
3.14 CHAIN OF COMMAND, APPLICATION OF 
All communication (written or oral) shall be via the chain of command, up 
or down. The chain of command shall be used in handling all 
Departmental business. 
3.15 ORDERS 
A. Manner of Issuing Orders 
Orders from superior to subordinate shall be in clear and 
understandable language, civil in tone, and issued pursuant to 
Departmental business. 
B. Following Orders/Insubordination 
Personnel shall obey any lawful order from any superior promptly, 
thoroughly, courteously, and professionally. Failure to do so is 
insubordination. Should such order conflict with any provision of 
any manual or previous order from another supervisor, the 
employee shall promptly and respectfully call attention to such 
conflict of orders for the benefit of said supervisor. If the supervisor 
does not change the order to obviate such conflict, the order shall 
stand. Compliance with an order later found to be in violation of a 
Department Manual shall be a defense to internal Department 
action. 
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K. Prisoners - Female 
Physical contact with female prisoners or suspects shall be limited 
to that which is necessary in taking them into custody and 
determining weapons are not being concealed. This order 
should not be construed as to prevent male officers from making 
necessary searches of female prisoners for weapons in cases 
where a hidden weapon is suspected, and when female officers are 
not present or immediately available. 
L. Recommending Lawyers/Bondsmen to Prisoners or Others 
No member of this Department shall recommend or suggest to 
anyone the employment or name of any person, firm, or 
corporation as attorney, counsel, or bondsmen, except that nothing 
herein shall be construed as restricting the rights of members of the 
Department in connection with the administration of their private 
affairs. Persons requesting a recommendation will be courteously 
directed to a public source of information. 
M. Reporting Violations 
Any employee who sees an action which may be a violation of 
sections A through L shall immediately report the incident to an on-
duty supervisor or any person in higher authority. 
3.29 UNSATISFACTORY PERFORMANCE 
A. Employees shall maintain sufficient competence to properly 
perform their duties and assume the responsibilities of their 
positions. 
B. Repeated poor evaluations and records of repeated violations of 
orders, rules, procedures, or other directives of the Department 
shall be considered examples of unsatisfactory performance. 
C. Employees shall perform their duties in a manner which will 
maintain the highest standard of efficiency in carrying out the 
functions and objectives of the Department. Examples of 
unsatisfactory performance may be demonstrated by a lack of 
knowledge of the application of laws to be enforced; unwillingness 
or inability to perform assigned tasks; the failure to conform to work 
standards established for an employee's rank, grade, or position; 
the failure to take appropriate action on the occasion of a crime; 
disorder, or other condition deserving police attention; the neglect 
of duty; the display of cowardice, absence without leave, or the 
physical or mental inability to perform required duties. 
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4.0 DISCIPLINARY ACTION 
The primary objective of discipline is to gain the willing participation of all 
employees in meeting established goals of the Department and City. 
Discipline should have a positive meaning, that of training and corrective 
instruction, which develop self-control, personal discipline, orderliness, 
and efficiency. Disciplinary action should aid in promoting efficient public 
service and harmonious working relationships. 
When all personnel collectively take pride in their organization and the 
standards they maintain, there will be little need for negative discipline. It 
is incumbent upon everyone, particularly supervisors, to establish and 
maintain a proper climate for discipline~a climate within a work situation 
which guarantees that standards of performance and conduct are well 
understood. 
When there is deviation from established principle, the matter must be 
investigated and corrected promptly. All employees should know that 
delinquencies will be dealt with by a supervisor who becomes aware of 
such situations. 
The handling of disciplinary matters shall be done in a forthright manner. 
There shall never be any compromise with principle where the need for 
positive or negative discipline exists. 
Criminal violations will be pursued for criminal as well as Departmental 
actions whereby one type of action is construed to be independent of the 
other. 
4.4 CAUSES FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION 
Disciplinary action may be meted out to any employee of the Police 
Department, including part-time employees, Reserve Police Officers, 
for violation of one or more established rules or regulations contained in 
the Saratoga Springs Police Department Rules and Regulations Manual, 
Saratoga Springs Police Dept. Policies and Procedures Manual and the 
City of Saratoga Springs Personnel Policies &Procedures Manual. 
4.8 ADMINISTRATIVE PARAMETERS 
Appropriate disciplinary action shall be commensurate with the 
seriousness of the offense and with due consideration of the employee's 
prior performance record. These specific considerations shall be 
documented in writing. 
37 
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2. If it is determined an immediate counseling session will 
correct the immediate consequences or continuance of an 
offense so as not to conflict with the misfeasant employee's 
duty performance AND that a Verbal Counseling session is 
the commensurate discipline for the offense in question, the 
provisions of Section 4.24(A) shall be carried out; or 
3. If the circumstances of the offense do not fall within the 
conditions stated in either 4.24(A)(1) or 4.24(A)(2), the 
discovering supervisor shall prepare a written memorandum, 
in duplicate, containing the following information: 
a. Subject matter of the memorandum; 
b. Description of the offense with reference to the 
specific Section(s), along with date, time, and 
location; 
c. Results of investigations conducted; and 
d. Other pertinent facts. 
NOTE: Under no circumstances shall the discovering supervisor 
make any recommendation for disciplinary actions in this 
memorandum. 
The original transmittal shall be forwarded to the misfeasant employee's 
immediate supervisor having administrative responsibilities for the 
employee who shall promptly investigate the reported matter. 
4.36 PRE-DISCIPLINARY ACTION PROCEDURE 
Prior to meting out any disciplinary/punitive action other than Verbal 
Counseling and Letter of Reprimand, the Chief of Police shall ascertain 
the following pre-requisites are satisfied: 
A. The concerned employee shall be given written notice of the 
proposed action. This notice shall include the information as to: 
1. Authority to impose disciplinary action. 
2. A description of the offense with reference to the specific 
Section(s) along with date, time, and location information as 
brought forth by the involved supervisor(s). 
3. Intention as to type, term, and nature of disciplinary action. 
4. Rationale for decision to impose disciplinary action. 
5. Response instruction which shall include: that the employee 
will be given the opportunity to respond, either in writing or 
orally, to the authority initially imposing discipline, within ten 
administrative days, a request for extension of this time 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
period will be considered if it appears to be reasonable. The 
method of response is at the discretion of the employee. If 
the employee does not respond within the time frame 
indicated, he/she will be deemed to have waived his/her 
right to such a hearing. At this time the waiver may not 
rescinded. 
6. Insofar as any particular case may arise that indicates to the 
Chief of Police that discharge, termination, or resignation 
MAY be the final disposition; the Chief of Police shall have 
one of a number of alternatives at his command. 
7. During the time element the accused has to file his/her oral 
or written response to the action to be taken, the Chief of 
Police MAY: 
a. Leave the employee working his normal shift 
assignment. 
b. In the case of a patrol officer being involved, may 
reassign the officer to limited duty within the confines 
of the station. 
c. Suspend the employee with pay. 
d. Place the employee on "inactive duty: - with 
instructions to telephone their supervisor each 
morning for possible assignment. The employee will 
be on "Inactive status". 
4.40 DISCIPLINARY ACTION DISPOSITION 
Upon receipt of pre-disciplinary action notification pursuant to Section 
4.36, the accused employee shall elect to either accept the proposed 
disciplinary action or request a hearing. 
A. If the employee elects to accept the proposed disciplinary action 
terms as outlined by the Chief of Police, he/she shall not take any 
response action to the pre-disciplinary action notification. The 
Chief of Police shall mete out the proposed disciplinary action upon 
expiration of the employee's response date. A formal Disciplinary 
Report shall be prepared. 
B. If the employee elects to request a hearing to the proposed 
disciplinary action terms as outlined by the Chief of Police, he/she 
shall follow the response instructions contained within the pre-
disciplinary action notification. If a hearing is requested pursuant to 
the provisions of Section 4.36, the Chief of Police shall schedule 
and conduct such a session within ten administrative work days 
upon receipt of this request. The Chief of Police shall render a 
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(n) Abuse of sick leave. 
(o) Inattention to duty, tardiness, indolence, carelessness, or 
negligence in the care and handling of City property. 
(p) The employee's failure to resolve a physical or mental 
infirm ity(ies) or defect(s) affecting job performance when it is 
within the capacity of the employee to do so. 
(q) Outside employment of a police employee which conflicts 
with the employee's position and is not specifically 
authorized by the Police Chief 
(r) Acceptance from any source of any emolument, reward, gift, 
or other form of remuneration in addition to the employee's 
regular compensation, as a personal benefit to the employee 
for actions performed in the normal course of the 
employee's assigned duties. 
(s) Falsification of any City report or record or of any report or 
record required to be, or filed by the owner. 
(t) Violation of any of the provisions of the City Code, lawful 
ordinances, resolutions, or any rules, regulations, or policies 
which may be prescribed by the City Council, City Manager, 
Police Chief, or supervisor. 
(u) Political activities precluded by State or Federal law." 
1. Records 
"Original copies of all written records pertaining to any 
matter which has resulted in disciplinary action shall be 
maintained in the employee's personnel file." 
4.56 GRIEVANCE DEFINED 
A grievance shall be considered as any matter for which appeal is 
provided for concerning a dispute. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Grievance Procedure 
To promote improved employer/employee relations by establishing 
grievance procedures on matters for which appeal or hearing is not 
provided by other regulations. 
To afford employees individually or through qualified employee 
organizations a systematic means of obtaining further 
consideration of problems after every other reasonable effort has 
failed to resolve them through discussions. 
To provide grievances shall be settled as near as possible to the 
point of origin. 
To provide grievances shall be heard and settled as informally as 
possible. 
According to the City Personnel Policies & Procedures Manual, any 
employee who feels the policy of the Dept. is not being appropriately applied to 
his/her circumstance; he/she shall take the following action: 
EMPLOYEE APPEAL PROCESS 
1. GENERAL POLICY. In accordance with Utah Code Ann. §10-3-1106 and 
City Ordinance, when any officer or employee of the City shall be 
discharged or transferred from one position to another, he or she shall 
have the right to appeal the discharge or transfer to an appeal board. 
2. APPEAL BOARD. The Appeal Board will consist of five members, two of 
whom shall be members of the governing body and three of whom shall 
be chosen by and from the appointive officers and employees of the city. 
3. SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS OF THE APPEAL BOARD. 
The City Council shall in July of each year appoint the members and 
alternate members of the Appeal Board selected as herein provided. The 
City Council shall select and appoint two members of the City Council as 
members of the Appeal Board and one member of the City Council as an 
alternate member of the Appeal Board. The City Council shall appoint the 
three members of the Appeal Board and one alternative member of the 
Appeal Board selected by the officers and employees of the City as herein 
provided. Employee members of the Appeal Board will be elected by 
popular vote. Each City employee will vote for three employee members 
of the Appeal Board from the City's employees. The top three vote getters 
will become the employee members of the Appeal Board and the fourth 
top vote getter will become the alternate employee member of the Appeal 
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Board, The election of the employee members of the Appeal Board shall 
be conducted by the City Recorder or a person appointed by the City 
Recorder and shall be held in at a time and in a manner determined by 
the City Recorder but the arrangements for choosing the members of the 
Appeal Board from the employees shall in no way restrict a free selection 
of members of the Appeal Board by the employees of the City. The 
election of employee members of the Appeal Board shall be held each 
year prior to the meeting of the City Council in July each year at which the 
members of the Appeal Board are appointed by the City Council The 
terms of office of the members of the Appeal Board shall be one year from 
their appointment or until their successors are chosen and appointed 
Members of the Appeal Board shall receive no compensation for services. 
4. APPEALS PROCEDURES All full-time employees of the City, other than7 
the City Manager, and department heads, shall have the right to appeal 
any discharge or transfer to the Appeal Board. 
A. The appeal shall be taken by filing written notice of the appeal with 
the Recorder within 10 days after the discharge or transfer. If an 
employee fails to file such written notice within such 10 days the 
employee will be deemed to have waived all appeal rights., 
B. Upon the filing of the appeal, the City Recorder shall forthwith refer 
a copy of the same to the Appeal Board. Upon receipt of the 
referral from the City Recorder, the Appeal Board shall forthwith 
commence its investigation, take and receive evidence and fully 
hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause of the 
discharge or transfer-
C. The employee shall be entitled to appear in person and to be 
represented by counsel, to have a public hearing, to confront the 
witness whose testimony is to be considered, and to examine the 
evidence to be considered by the Appeal Boardn The burden is on 
the employee to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
termination or transfer was arbitrary or capricious or was contrary 
to law. 
D. The decision of the Appeal Board shall be by secret ballot. After 
balloting, the decision shall be counted, and revealed in the 
presence of the same members that voted. Three affirmative votes 
shall be required for any decision of the Appeal Board. A member 
may not abstain from voting. The voting shall be limited to 
upholding or reversing the decision on appeal before the Appeal 
Board based solely on whether the termination or transfer was 
arbitrary or capricious or was contrary to law. If the Appeal Board 
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reverses the decision, the Appeal Board may provide that an 
employee shall receive his pay for the period of time during which 
he or she is discharged, or any deficiency in pay for the period he 
or she was transferred to a position of less remuneration but not to 
exceed a 15 day period. 
In the event the Appeal Board upholds the discharge or transfer, 
the employee may have 10 days thereafter to appeal to the City 
Council. An employee must submit a written notice of appeal to the 
City Recorder within 10 days after the decision of the Appeal Board 
is certified to the City Recorder or the employee will be deemed to 
have waived all appeal rights. The City Council's decision shall be 
final after hearing the evidence in the same manner as provided for 
in the appeal to the Appeal Board. If the City Council upholds the 
discharge or transfer the employee shall have no additional appeal 
rights. If the City Council reverses the decision, the City Council 
may provide that an employee shall receive his pay for the period 
of time during which he or she is discharged, or any deficiency in 
pay for the period he or she was transferred to a position of less 
remuneration but not to exceed a 15 day period. 
In the event the Appeal Board does not uphold the discharge or 
transfer, the case shall be closed and no further proceedings shall 
be had. In the event that the Appeal Board or the City Council 
does not uphold the discharge, or transfer, the City Recorder shall 
certify the decision to the employee affected, and also to the City 
Manager. The employee shall be paid his salary, commencing with 
the next working day following certification by the City Recorder of 
the Appeal Board's or the City Council's decision, provided that the 
employee, or officer concerned, reports for his assigned duties 
during that next working day. 
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